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ABSTRACT
Analyzing Android Adware
by Supraja Suresh
Most Android smartphone apps are free; in order to generate revenue, the app
developers embed ad libraries so that advertisements are displayed when the app is
being used. Billions of dollars are lost annually due to ad fraud. In this research, we
propose a machine learning based scheme to detect Android adware based on static
and dynamic features. We collect static features from the manifest file, while dynamic
features are obtained from network traffic. Using these features, we initially classify
Android applications into broad categories (e.g., adware and benign) and then further
classify each application into a more specific family. We employ a variety of machine
learning techniques including neural networks, random forests, adaboost and support
vector machines.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Dr.Mark Stamp for his guidance and support throughout
the project and my degree program. I am grateful to Fabio Di Troia for his suggestions
to improvise the project and to Dr. Katerina Potika for being helpful and for her
valuable time.
I would also like to thank my family and friends for being my strength and
support throughout the course of my Master’s degree.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Overview of Advertising in the Web Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Overview of Advertising in the Mobile Domain . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Overview of Android . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4 Android Adware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4.1 GhostClicker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4.2 Judy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.3 Copycat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.4 HummingBad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4.5 Hamob . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4.6 MarsDaemon/Marswin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4.7 Origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.5 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.6 Machine Learning Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6.1 Random Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.6.2 Adaboost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.6.3 Support Vector Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.6.4 Deep Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
vi
vii
3.1 Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2 Feature Collection and Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.2.1 Static Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.2 Dynamic Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 Recursive Feature Elimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4 Experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1 Experiments Conducted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.1 Scenario A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.2 Scenario B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.3 Scenario C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.1.4 Scenario D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2 Evaluation Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3.1 Results for Scenario A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3.2 Results for Scenario B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3.3 Results for Scenario C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3.4 Results for Scenario D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
5 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
LIST OF REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
APPENDIX
Results for Adware vs Benign Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
LIST OF TABLES
1 Android Application Family and their Count . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2 Extracted Static Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3 Extracted Dynamic Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4 Important Features by Adaboost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5 Important Features by Random Forest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Ad Fraud Common Examples [1] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2 Android Architecture [2] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3 Predicting a label using Random Forest [3]. . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
4 SVM Line Hyperplane and Maximum Margin of Separation. . . . 16
5 Input Space to Higher Dimensional Feature Space. . . . . . . . . 17
6 Single Perceptron Flow [4] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
7 MLP with 2 Hidden Layers [5] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
8 Flow Chart of Static Feature Extraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
9 Partial Json Result of Apps from ApkAnalyser . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10 Flow Chart of Dynamic Feature Extraction. . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
11 Accuracy of Models for Static, Dynamic and Combined Features
for Adware vs Benign Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
12 Area under ROC for Combined Features for Adware vs Benign . . 33
13 RFE on Combined Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
14 Accuracy of identifying family of apps using combined features . 35
15 Accuracy of classifying each family vs benign apps with ad . . . . 39
A.16 Area under ROC with combined features for SVC . . . . . . . . . 45
A.17 RFE of Static Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.18 RFE of Dynamic Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
A.19 Accuracy of Classifying each Family against Benign Apps without
Ads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
ix
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Advertisements are used to promote or sell a product, an idea or a service. The
advent of the internet, and later the smartphone, has pushed marketing strategies
towards digitizing advertisements as it’s the new norm and the digital channel is
rapidly growing with no signs of slowing down [6]. These ads are displayed while
browsing a website online or while using a mobile application. A majority of the
smartphones are built on the Android platform which led to the growth of a huge
ecosystem of apps. This rapid growth gave rise to the increase in the apps with
malicious intent. Most of the apps are available for free use. Based on statistics from
the 4th quarter of 2017, 93.99% of the apps available in Google playstore are available
for free [7].
The major revenue generators for several free mobile apps and online web services
are through advertisements, but they are plagued by fraudulent activities [8]. Ads
fetched from ad providers are launched by interleaved ad libraries in the web page or
in the mobile apps and are displayed to the users. The ad providers pay the developers
of the app or the web page certain amount for each ad impression, i.e., each ad that
is fetched and displayed to the user. In addition, the developer gets paid for each
click the user makes on the displayed ads. Unfortunately, the problem of ad fraud
has been disrupting the advertising industry for a long time. When the developers
include code that fetches an ad but does not display it to the user, or when the app
clicks on an ad without user activity, this is fraudulent activity [9]. Software that
commits ad fraud is called Adware.
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Cybercriminals profit from the ad industry and it affects the users and businesses
in several ways. Adware can be structured to steal sensitive information from a user’s
phone and pass it on to third parties. Adware not only displays annoying pop-up
messages, but attackers can root users phone and gain access to the devices [10].
Adware can be also used for other purposes, such as performing DoS attacks.
There are slight differences in how ad fraud is committed on the web and on
mobile devices. In the web context, ad fraud is often perpetrated by botnets, which
are collections of compromised user machines called bots. Fraudsters issue fabricated
impressions and clicks using bots so that the traffic they generate is varied (i.e., by IP
address), making such fraud difficult to detect [8]. The user system has to be infected
with malware so that it acts as a bot and receives a command from a central server
to display ads and clicks on them automatically. In the mobile world, at most one
application runs in the foreground, while several can run in the background. If the
application running in the background fetches ads or clicks on the ads, it is committing
ad fraud. Fraudulent activity also includes the case in which the application fetches
the ad but does not display it to the user, or clicks on the ad automatically. Such
fraud can be caused by code in the application which could turn the phone into a bot
by downloading modules that infect the device and display ads based on commands
from the botnet command and control server.
The main purpose of this research is to analyze the use of machine learning
as a possible solution to detect adware. This can be done by classifying the apps
based on the features obtained from the static and dynamic analysis. Static features
may involve features extracted from Java byte code or from the Android manifest
file, AndroidManifest.xml. As static analysis cannot detect dynamic code injection
or loading we also extract dynamic information. Dynamic analysis can be done by
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running the code and monitoring API calls, network traffic, and other similar aspects.
In this paper, we consider dynamic information obtained by monitoring network traffic
while executing the application. These features can be used for isolating fraudulent
traffic from legitimate traffic and identifying different families of adware.
The remainder of the report is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives a basic
overview of advertising in the web and mobile domains and detection mechanisms.
Chapter 3 discusses the proposed methodology. Chapter 4 explains the experiments
performed and the results obtained while Chapter 5 outlines future enhancements.
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CHAPTER 2
Background
This chapter provides the needed background information related to advertising,
android, adware, ideas and existing solution to detect adware and the basic machine
learning techniques used in the research.
2.1 Overview of Advertising in the Web Domain
Advertising in the web involves ads displayed as a part of the website to the
user. The website owner called the publisher embeds ads in the website using libraries
provided by the third party ad providers in the <iframe> or <script> tags whose src
attribute points to the ad provider’s ad servers [8]. These ad providers are responsible
for finding and selecting advertisements and they also pay the publishers for the ads
displayed. When a user loads the website, an ad request is made along with the
publisher id and user related information so that appropriate ads can be selected as,
different ads target different groups of users. The response to this contains the pixel
URL, click URL and content URL. The content is provided by the ad provider itself
and the marketers who want their ads to be displayed via a provider use a tracking
pixel to track the ads so that the marketers are not charged for fraudulent activities
by the provider [8]. The click URL contains the corresponding page that will be
loaded when an ad is clicked.
The web front is plagued by several types of ad fraud due to botnets, ghost sites,
ad stacking or purchased traffic. Bots are programs on normal user computers that
can be controlled by a central Command and Control server (C&C). The C&C server
together with the bots form a botnet which can be used to click on ads on a web
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page or generate excessive web traffic and overwhelm a server. Ghost sites are legit
websites whose content are old or copied from other websites and they have several ad
slots. These sites are usually not visited by the users but by the bots generating ad
impressions with no return on investment. At a given time only one ad can be viewed
and stack ads on top of the other generate multiple ad impressions but only one ad
is displayed to the user. In addition to ghost sites, bots can also visit legitimate and
popular websites and view ads thus creating fraudulent impressions [11]. This traffic
can be purchased by the publishers thus increasing their revenue.
2.2 Overview of Advertising in the Mobile Domain
Mobile advertising usually comprises of ads displayed in android apps most of
which are freely available in numerous app stores. The app developer generates
revenue when ads are displayed to the user and when the user clicks the ads. To
achieve this, the app developer obtains a publisher id by registering to an android ad
provider and embeds the ad library provided in the application code. This library
takes care of fetching the ads through an HTTP request and displays it to the user
after receiving the pixel, click and content URL from the ad server. Most ad libraries
implement the requesting ad and display it by simply loading an ad element in a web
view [8].
Advertising in smartphones also suffers from ad fraud in the form of fraudulent
impressions, auto-clicking, fat finger fraud, multiple sdk libraries and pixel stuffing. In
an app, it is possible to have several sdks from different ad providers and ad networks
but ideally, only one of the ads will be displayed in a spot; the rest being counted as
fraudulent impressions. Pixel stuffing occurs when an ad, say, of dimensions 1024×480
pixels are crammed to a 1× 1 pixel on the app screen which is not visible to the user.
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Pixel stuffing also occurs in the web domain where it is also termed iframe stuffing.
Fat finger fraud occurs when an ad is placed near the navigation buttons in a phone
with the intention to make the user accidentally click it. It is also a common practice
in mobile applications to give a reward like an extra life in a game or extra points
for watching an ad. The user could open the ad and even click on it without being
interested in the content, this user behavior is not addressed as a part of the research.
Figure 1: Ad Fraud Common Examples [1]
2.3 Overview of Android
Android is one of the most popular operating systems to run applications on
the mobile phone. It is an open source project, with Google as one of its major
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contributors. It allows apps developed on this platform to run on different hardware
devices provided it has Android installed. Figure 2 shows the major components in
the architecture of an Android operating system.
Figure 2: Android Architecture [2]
It is built on top of Linux and provides abstractions needed to interact with the
hardware components like keyboard, camera, and screen. It contains several libraries
on top of it for storage of information, web browsing, working with audio and other
functions. Several java-based android libraries are available for development purposes,
a developer can use app library to access the application, webkit library to incorporate
browsing functionalities into the application, text to control the displayed text and
view for building the interface the user interacts with to name a few.
The Android Runtime contains the core libraries and also provisions a Dalvik Vir-
tual Machine (DVM) which is similar to java virtual machine that has been improvised
for android. The Dalvik bytecode generated from java bytecode of an application is
run on this DVM. It is worthy to note that each application in android runs in its
own DVM. The Application Framework layer exposes several classes that can be
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used by the applications to perform needed functions. Some of the available classes
include activity manager, content provider, and notification manager. Applications
are built on top of the application framework and it provides the interface for the
user. It comes packaged as a .apk file with the needed libraries, AndroidManifest.xml,
and classes.dex file. While the manifest file contains the list of permissions, content
providers, and resources used, the classes.dex file contains the packaged application
code without duplicated sections.
2.4 Android Adware
Adware is a malicious software that presents the user with unwanted ads. This
often annoys the user more than causing harm. The main target of adware is to
generate revenue for the publisher, some types of adware also collect information
regarding the user and his activities without user’s consent. This type of adware is
also called spyware. The behavior of an adware depends on the family the application
belongs to, the recent adware families used in this research are described below.
2.4.1 GhostClicker
Applications belonging to the GhostClicker family are known for automatically
clicking the ads once downloaded. According to Trendlabs, the auto clicking routines
are embedded in the Facebook Ad software development kit (SDK) and in Google
Mobile Services (GMS) as a legit logs package thus avoiding suspicion. It also tries
to evade detection by checking the system property and triggering the auto clicker
routine only when it is not nexus as android emulators used for detecting malware
usually are termed as “Nexus XXX”. Some of the apps also request device admin
permission which when provided makes it difficult to uninstall. The auto clicker is
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not implemented in javascript code but inserts itself into Google’s advertising platform
and gets the ad location and simulates clicking [12].
2.4.2 Judy
In 2017, researchers from Checkpoint crawled Google play and identified around
41 applications that automatically clicked on ads and termed this family as Judy. All
these applications were from a Korean firm and it invaded Google Plays Bouncer, a
program that prevents malicious apps from entering play store. Once the app was
installed it relies on C&C server for operation. The C&C server gives a user agent,
javascript code and url’s. The URL’s are opened using the user agent and then the
javascript code takes care of clicking on the ads [13].
2.4.3 Copycat
Copycat is an adware campaign identified by researchers at Checkpoint that
reached its peak during April and May 2016. It affected around 14 million devices
worldwide, rooted around 8 million devices generating around $1.5 million in revenue
to the group [14]. The infected apps rooted the user’s device and gave control of
the user’s device to the attackers. It steals revenue in two ways, first by substituting
the referrerID with a fraudulent id when apps are downloaded and the second by
displaying unwanted ads based on conditions. It was the initial family of adware that
injected code to the Zygote process.
2.4.4 HummingBad
HummingBad installs a rootkit to the device and it generates revenue for the
attackers by installing fraudulent apps and generates fraudulent ad revenue. The
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malicious components are encrypted making it harder to detect and it uses two attack
vectors so that if one fails the other can meet the objective. The apps look for certain
events like a timeout or whether the screen is on and then it roots the device and tries
to connect to the C&C center. The other attack strategy kicks in when it does not get
the root privileges. At first, it tries social engineering methods through a component
called ’qs’ that gets decrypted and connects to the C&C server from where it can
download apps, initiate referrer requests for generating Google Play advertisement
revenue or launch applications [15].
2.4.5 Hamob
Hamob is an adware that usually does not do much harm other than display ads
when installed in the device [16]. It captures information about the user and then
uses it to send a large number of ads and annoys the user.
2.4.6 MarsDaemon/Marswin
Once installed the infected app displays ads and will not stop even when the
application is force stopped. It spawns several processes and creates a file and locks
it [17]. The processes check the file and see if they are locked and start a process
when a related process is dead. This ensures that the ad libraries can inject apps by
not killing the apps even when forced.
2.4.7 Origin
Origin is a family of applications that poses to be benign but in the background
sends user information to a C&C server and delivers an ad to the user. Thus it acts as
a trojan and adware. Email, appid, gcmid ,imei identifier are some of the information
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that is sent to the server and based on the command received it can show banner
ads, redirect to facebook or chrome and installing shortcuts on the screen. At least
100 applications are estimated to be affected by this adware according to analysts at
Dr.Web. As the behavior depends on several factors it makes it hard to detect.
2.5 Related Work
In the web advertising realm, Daswani provided a detailed study of the clickbot
architecture and various techniques for detection to help other researchers interested
in this area. Detection techniques for fabricated impression, clicks, and duplicate
clicks (where the publisher clicks the same ad many times) have been proposed in [18,
19] but these techniques fail when trying to combat botnets.
Considerably less research work has been done with a focus on ad fraud through
mobile devices. Security companies like TrendMicro, Checkpoint, and others identify
fraudulent apps in the Google Play store and report them to be removed so that
it does not affect further users. By then, the damage is already done and we need
mechanisms to detect before it affects the users. On this front, Liu [20] made a
significant contribution by trying to identify fraud through ad stacking and hidden
ad rendering. The experiment used a technique to analyze UI of the apps and then
detect but it fails when ad traffic is generated in the background.
Initial work in this field was done by Miller and his team where they performed
a detailed analysis of clickbot families Fiesta and 7cy [21]. This paved the way to
understand the working of a clickbot. In the recent years, Crussell [8] proposed an
analysis tool called MADFraud which detected fraudulent impressions and click after
running the apps automatically. This approach used machine learning for identifying
ad requests and used HTTP request trees and heuristics to detect adfraud. On the
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other hand, Arp and his team proposed a lightweight method to detect android mal-
ware using only static features fed to a machine learning model [22]. They gathered
extensive static features and used SVM for classification but it does not take into
account the features from dynamic analysis. This is a drawback as attacks due to
code transformation appear only during dynamic analysis and cannot be detected by
this mechanism.
Grace and team [23] analyzed the permissions used by in-app ad-libraries to
determine the potential risks caused by these libraries. The authors from [24] used a
two order risk analysis scheme to identify and classify malware on basis of risks. The
first order depends on permissions of an application while the second order uses certain
heuristics to identify risky applications. Researchers in [25] also used permissions to
identify malicious applications.
Detection using dynamic analysis has also been performed earlier on the apps.
The authors of TaintDroid [26] and DroidScope [27] performed detailed analysis of the
applications by running in a controlled environment but are complex to be deployed
on the mobile phones. Authors of [28] detected malware using network traffic features
and achieved accuracy above 90% using 8 distinguishing features. More recently, a
network-based android malware detection and characterization mechanism was pro-
posed by Lashkari [29] and his team which aims to segregate malware, adware, and
benign apps. They proposed that 9 traffic features are needed for classifying the apps
using machine learning. Though this provided a good method it had few limitations
in data collection method. An efficient algorithm to minimize the number of network
traffic based features to detect malware was introduced in [30]. Several deep learning
methods were proposed to segregate malware based on network traffic like [31], [32]
and [33] outlined a method to use deep learning using static features. We employ
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several static and dynamic methods to derieve features and propose a solution to
detect adware and classify them according to their families using machine learning
techniques.
2.6 Machine Learning Models
Machine learning relates to the field where a computer can learn by itself given
some data without programming for it explicitly [34]. It involves training a model or
an algorithm with data that has the final outcome, this is called Supervised Learning.
When the model is trained with data without providing the final outcome it is called
Unsupervised Learning. For this research, we know that if a given apk is an adware
or not so we use supervised learning models like random forest, adaboost, support
vector machine (SVM) and a deep learning based model called Multilayer Perceptron
(MLP).
2.6.1 Random Forest
Random Forest algorithm is an ensemble supervised classification algorithm that
combines several weak learners to form a strong learner. The weak learners used here
are Decision Trees. It is a non-linear model and in addition to using boosting it also
uses a bagging approach, here not only are the samples chosen at random for each
decision tree but also the features are chosen at random. This randomness prevents
the problem of overfitting that the decision trees face.
In simpler terms, for a dataset with 5 samples 𝑋1,𝑋2,𝑋3,𝑋4,𝑋5 with labels
𝐿1,𝐿2,𝐿1,𝐿2,𝐿1 and features 𝑓1,𝑓2,𝑓3 each. Then Random Forest may create 3 weak
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classifiers with inputs as
Weak classifier 1: (𝑊1) = [𝑋1, 𝑋3, 𝑋5] with features 𝑓1, 𝑓2
Weak classifier 2: (𝑊2) = [𝑋2, 𝑋4, 𝑋5] with features 𝑓2, 𝑓3
Weak classifier 3: (𝑊3) = [𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑋3] with features 𝑓1, 𝑓3
Here we can see that each weak learner takes a subset of the input with overlap
and only a subset of the features is used. After training the final outcome of a test
sample is the majority outcome of those of the weak learners. Say for a test sample 𝑋6
the 3 weak classifiers output 1,-1,1 then, the final outcome is 1. An added advantage
of this ensemble model is that it can also show the importance of each feature that
can be used for gaining various insights.
Figure 3 shows the steps in prediciting the label of a given input
Figure 3: Predicting a label using Random Forest [3].
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2.6.2 Adaboost
The Adaboost algorithm was the pioneer in boosting based Machine Learning
models. It improves the prediction accuracy by considering a number of inaccurate
results and combining them. Similar to random forest the weak classifiers are trained
on a subset, with overlap, of the training data and each has a weight associated to it
that determines the probability of its occurrence in the subset. The weight of an entry
is increased when it is misclassified so that the next classifier can perform well on these
misclassified samples. While combining the results of the weak classifiers, ones with
higher accuracy are given more weights which inturn influences the final prediction.
The weighted training samples are used to train the weak classifiers which are added
one by one till a pre-defined number of classifiers or when no more improvement can
be achieved during training. In the end, it has a set of weak classifiers each with a
stage value which decides the final output. For Example, consider the output labels
for the 5 weak classifiers to be 1,-1,1,-1,1 then the output can be expected to be 1
as that’s the maximum value, but in adaboost the final output is linear weighted
combination of the predicted values. If each stage weight is 0.3,0.9,0.2,0.7,0.5 and
using a linear combination we get -0.6 which gives the final output as -1. Unlike
random forests, adaboost can be used with any classifier like decision trees, SVC and
others.
2.6.3 Support Vector Machines
Support Vector Machine is a supervised algorithm that works by identifying the
optimal hyperplane. It accepts an n-dimensional input and then it generates an
n-1 dimensional hyperplane to classify the samples and predict the label. For a 2-
dimensional input with 2 labels the hyperplane is a line that separates one class of
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labels from the other. SVM is based on the following concepts :
Maximizing the Margin: For a binary classification with 2-dimensional input
in Figure 4, the hyperplane is the solid yellow line and the margin is formed by
the dashed line that represents the minimum distance between the hyperplane and a
sample from the training set. The main aim in SVM is to maximize the margin and
the solid black lines to the hyperplane are called the support vectors.
Figure 4: SVM Line Hyperplane and Maximum Margin of Separation.
Working in a higher dimensional space: Hyperplane can be identified and
used for separation only when the data is linearly separable. When the data is not
linearly separable, to classify the training set we first need to map the input space
to a higher dimensional feature space where the data is linearly separable; and then
identify the separating hyperplane. In Figure 5 we can see that for a non-linearly
separable input data when a transformation is applied it becomes linearly separable.
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Figure 5: Input Space to Higher Dimensional Feature Space.
Kernel trick: The mapping function that makes the non-linearly separable data
to linearly separable is called the kernel trick.
2.6.4 Deep Learning
In this experiment we used Multilayer Perceptron (MLP), a deep learning model.
It consists of a network of perceptron/neurons. The output of a perceptron is a linear
combination of inputs based on weights passed through an activation function.
𝑦 = 𝜑
(︂ 𝑛∑︁
𝑖=1
𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖
)︂
(1)
In Equation 1, 𝑥 forms the input vector, 𝑤 the weight vector, 𝑏 the bias vector
and the 𝜑 forms the activation function. Figure 6 shows a single flow of data through
a perceptron.
Several activation functions like RELU, logistic sigmoid, hyperbolic tangent are
available. These functions add the needed non-linearity for making the network more
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Figure 6: Single Perceptron Flow [4]
powerful. For our experiments, we used hyperbolic tangent which squishes the input
to be within -1 to 1. It is given by
tanh(𝑥) =
2
1 + exp−2𝑥
− 1
.
A single layer perceptron is less effective and hence multiple layers are stacked
to form a multilayer perceptron. It usually has one Input Layer, several Hidden
Layers and an Output Layer [35]. The data passes from one layer to the other and is
subjected to several transformations after which it is given as the output.
MLP, when used for a supervised algorithm, tries to understand the relationship
between the input and labels of a training set through transformations and then tries
to predict the label for a test set. It relies on Backpropagation Algorithm for updating
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the weights. It has two steps
1. Forward Pass: The inputs are used to calculate the output values using Equa-
tion 1
2. Backward Pass: The weights are adjusted by backpropagating the partial
derivatives of the cost function and the error derivatives. This can be achieved
by simply applying the chain rule.
Figure 7 shows an MLP with 2 hidden layers, one input, and one output layer.
It can also be considered as fully connected layers as the outputs from all the nodes
in a layer are propagated to the next.
Figure 7: MLP with 2 Hidden Layers [5]
The error function used here in the experiment is Cross-Entropy Loss Function
along with Softmax layer. This allows the output to be treated as a probability mea-
sure of a sample belonging to a class. Cross-Entropy is a distance measure between
probability distributions. The activations from the output layer are normalized using
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softmax given by 𝑠(𝑜𝑗) where
𝑠(𝑜𝑗) =
exp(𝑜𝑗(𝑥))∑︀
𝑘 exp(𝑜𝑘(𝑥))
Training involves updating the weight vectors through backpropagation and once
it is completed it can be used to predict the label for the test set. Thus from the
output of the softmax layer we obtain the class the test sample belongs to.
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CHAPTER 3
Methodology
This section initially describes the dataset collected and used. Then it describes
the procedure to collect and extract the features from static and dynamic analysis.
3.1 Dataset
The dataset used for this experiment was mostly collected manually. We initially
identified android adware families in the recent times from blogposts which listed the
infected apps package name or SHA keys or both. Then we downloaded the apks
and verified if it is infected or not on VirusTotal, an online tool that runs different
antivirus engines, websites and URL scanners and gives an aggregate result. Apps
for the adware families Hamob and Copycat the apks were obtained from the Drebin
dataset [22] and then verified to be malicious and then used. The benign apps were
obtained by first choosing apps from the playstore with and without ads, downloading
them and then making sure the apps are not infected in VirusTotal. A total of 266
apps were used in this experiment; the application family names and the count of
apps in each family are shown in Table 1.
3.2 Feature Collection and Extraction
The features collected and extracted play an important role in determining and
improving the model accuracy. The methodology used to extract the static and
dynamic features are described in this section.
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Table 1: Android Application Family and their Count
Family Name Count
Judy 45
GhostClicker 29
Origin 20
HummingBad 20
Hamob 16
CopyCat 12
Marswin 29
Benign without ads 48
Benign with ads 47
3.2.1 Static Features
Android applications distributed as .apk files contain AndroidManifest.xml,
classes.dex and other resources. Static analysis is a part of reverse engineering the
apk files without executing it. Static analysis of an apk involves analyzing the code
segments of the apk without running it on an emulator. It is difficult to detect ob-
fuscated code and dynamic code loading using this method. The major advantage
of static analysis is that the cost of computation is low and requires low resources.
Static analysis was conducted using a tool called ApkAnalyzer [36], a java tool to ex-
tract detailed information about the APK files. This in turn uses apktool to generate
a JSON describing the permissions, activities, services used and other information.
The tool gets information in several categories like:
1. Basic Metadata — The file name, size, source of download, size of compiled dex
and arc sizes
2. Manifest Metadata — The number of activities, listed and used permissions,
services, content providers and broadcast receivers, min, max and targeted sdk
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version and supported screen size.
3. Certificate Metadata — Signing algorithm used, issuer name, start and end
date, MD5 public key and hash of the certificate
4. Resources Metadata — The number of xml, gif, jpg, idpi, hdpi, layouts and
menus used to name a few.
5. File Hashes —Hashes of the dex files, resources, drawables, layout and all other
files in Manifest.MF
Permissions are one of the most important features in detecting malicious apk.
In addition to the permission we also used the activities as it represents the entry
point for user interaction. An app can have several activities and an activity of
one app can be used by another app if allowed. Next, the number of services was
extracted as it represents the long-running operations that run in the background for
an app. The broadcast receivers allow the apps to react to broadcast notifications or
announcements. The content provider manages the app data like the user’s contact
information on an android phone. It can also be used to store and retrieve data
private to an app.
One approach would have been to list all the values of the components mentioned
above and construct a feature vector, it would have been of very high dimensions.
Instead of building a high dimensional feature vector and reducing it, we wanted to
try and see if just using the count of these components like permissions, activities
and so on helps in identifying adware. The static features used for the experiments
are as shown in Table 2 .
For each app in the dataset, the ApkAnalyzer is used on the file to obtain the
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Table 2: Extracted Static Features
Number Static Feature Name
1 numberOfActivities
2 numberOfServices
3 numberOfContentProviders
4 numberOfBroadcastReceivers
5 numberOfPermissions
JSON file with app details. A custom parser to extract the above-mentioned features
were used on the JSON file and the static features were extracted and normalized.
The steps involved in extracting static features are shown in the below Figure 8 and
the sample partial json for adware, benign with and without ads are shown in Figure 9:
Figure 8: Flow Chart of Static Feature Extraction
3.2.2 Dynamic Features
Dynamic analysis involves running the apk in a real/emulated environment and
collecting information. It can detect dynamic code loading and gather application
information. The dynamic analysis could also involve monitoring the system call or
network traffic and the like. As the ads are from the provider the proposed methodol-
ogy monitors network traffic and tries to extract features based on the flow and count
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Benign app with ads
Adware
Figure 9: Partial Json Result of Apps from ApkAnalyser
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information. The apk was run on an Android Emulator called Bluestacks and then
the network traffic was captured using Wireshark in a Windows Virtual Box.
Steps:
1. Start Bluestacks and attach it as one of the emulators using ADB command –
adb connect 127.0.0.1:5555.
2. Store the apks in an input folder and pass the python script to Monkeyrunner
to automate installation.
3. Monkeyrunner picks each apk and installs it in bluestacks and starts the appli-
cation.
4. The python script also captures the network traffic using wireshark by run-
ning the application for 30 minutes when the user is interacting with the app
manually.
5. After the desired time, wireshark is stopped and the apk is uninstalled and
moves on to the next apk.
6. This process continues for each of the apks in the input folder.
The features from network analysis are extracted on several basis:
1. Packet-Based : Packet-based features are used to capture the packet statistics
like number of packets sent, number of packets received, the total number of
packets exchanged and the ratio of packets received to packets sent. We also
focused on DNS and HTTP protocol based packets as ads requests are served
over HTTP and ad domains are resolved using DNS in certain cases. DNS
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related - features like the number of DNS requests, DNS responses, the max,
min and average value of DNS answer length is also accounted for. HTTP
related - features like the number of HTTP requests, max, min and average
header length. Percentage of TCP, UDP, DNS requests out of the total packets
is also extracted.
2. Time-Based : Time based features have been proved effective in classifying the
network traffic [37] and using it as a basis we extracted features like the time
the flow was active (active time), the time the flow was idle (idle time), the
average number of packets per second and the average length of the packets in
both the directions per second.
3. Flow-Based : A flow is a sequence of packets with the same source and destina-
tion, IP and port along with the same protocol. The flow-based features include
number of flows and ratio of number of IP from which packets were received to
the number of IP to which packets were sent to.
4. Byte-Based : This captures the information transferred between the sender and
receiver and so the min, max and average size of the packets and the payload
of HTTP requests was extracted as byte-related features.
The pcap file thus generated also has few packets other than that of those from
the application which was filtered out. The features as shown in Table 4 were ex-
tracted with a python script using scapy, a powerful package manipulation program in
python. Scapy can perform tasks like scanning, filtering, probing, attacks or network
discovery [38]. The steps involved in extracting static features are shown in the below
Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Flow Chart of Dynamic Feature Extraction.
3.3 Recursive Feature Elimination
One can get a varied number of features for a task but one of the major questions
plaguing the machine learning field is ’ how many features is enough ?’ to effectively
and accurately address the task at hand. Not all features generated will be important,
we tried to identify the optimal number of features needed to identify adware by
using RFE with ten-fold cross-validation. We started with using the most important
features, then with 2, 3, . . . , 37 features and identified the number of features that
gave better results. The major advantage of using RFE is that it takes an algorithm
that gives feature importance and uses the specified number of features to train and
test. If for example, we specified the number of features to be used as 3 then RFE
runs and gets the most important feature, then runs the model with the remaining
features to identify the most important feature from the feature subset and includes
it; then does the same till the required features are identified. The major advantage
of using RFE is that it does not remove several features at a time as it would give
sub-optimal features. This approach of removing features recursively by building a
model on the remaining subset of features is proved to be effective.
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Table 3: Extracted Dynamic Features
S.No Dynamic Feature Name Description
1 dnsReqCount No of DNS requests
2 dnsResCount No of DNS responses
3 dnsAnswerLength Min, Max and Avg DNS answer
length
4 PayloadHttp Min, Max and Avg payload size of
the HTTP requests
5 noOfPkt Total no of packets exchanged
6 httpCount No of HTTP requests/responses
sent or received
7 HeaderLength Min, Max and Avg header length
in the HTTP requests made
8 PktSize Min, Max and Avg size of the
packets
9 noOfPktsSent No of packets sent
10 noOfPktsReceived No of Packets received
11 Percentage of TCP, UDP,
DNS
Percentage of the TCP,UDP and
DNS requests made out of the to-
tal values
12 ActiveTime Min, Max and Avg flow active
time
13 IdleTime Max, Min and Avg Idle time be-
tween Flows
14 flowCount No of flows observed
15 ratioOfRBySIP Ratio of number of IP from which
packets are recevied to the IP’s
sent to by the application
16 avgpktcountPerSec Average packets count per second
17 avgpktLenPerSecond Average packets length per second
18 ratioOfRBySPkts Ratio of packets received to pack-
ets sent in total
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CHAPTER 4
Experiments
This chapter discusses the experiments performed on the applications and the
corresponding results. First, the metrics used for evaluation are discussed and then
the results from the static and dynamic analysis are presented.
4.1 Experiments Conducted
We performed multiple experiments using static, dynamic and combined features
for the following scenarios.
4.1.1 Scenario A
We started off with a binary classification by considering all the adware families
as one group called adware and the benign apps with and without ads as benign, to
see how well can the models differentiate between adware and benign apps.
4.1.2 Scenario B
As in machine learning extracting features can be hard and there is no guarantee
that the features are useful for classification; Out of the total static(5), dynamic(32),
and combined(37) features we tested the ideal number of features needed to effectively
perform the binary classification using Recursive feature elimination(RFE).
4.1.3 Scenario C
In the next set of experiments, we tried to label the apps after classifying it to
adware or benign using a two-level classification mechanism where the first step as
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described in Scenario A and then ran a trained model to label the family the apps
belong to.
4.1.4 Scenario D
Lastly, we performed experiments to gauge the difficulty in identifying each fam-
ily of adware from the benign apps without ads and benign apps with ads. This
formed several sets of classifiers the results of which are described in the next section.
4.2 Evaluation Metrics
Accuracy is a measure that is used to determine how well the model detected
adware and the correctness of the predicted family of an apk. If
∙ True Positives (TP): number of positive examples, labeled as such.
∙ False Positives (FP): number of negative examples, labeled as positive.
∙ True Negatives (TN): number of negative examples, labeled as such.
∙ False Negatives (FN): number of positive examples, labeled as negative.
Then accuracy is defined by
accuracy = (TP + TN)/(TP + TN + FP + FN)
In addition to accuracy, we also consider area under the ROC curve. Roc curve is a
graph that plots True positive Rate vs False Positive Rate (TPR vs FPR). A model
with AUC-ROC values closer to 1 is considered to be a good classifier and if it is near
0.5 then it can be considered to perform worse than flipping a coin.
TPR = TP/(TP + FN)
FPR = FP/(FP + TN)
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4.3 Results
We experimented with algorithms like Random Forests(RF), Support Vector
Classifier(SVC), Adaboost and MLP for the above-mentioned use cases. Where in
each of the model was trained with 80% of the data and the remaining 20% of the
data was used for testing. The results of which are discussed below.
4.3.1 Results for Scenario A
Here we classified apps as adware or benign for all 3 sets of features as shown
in Figure 11. To have an idea of how the model would perform on new data we
performed ten-fold cross-validation where we split the dataset into 10 parts and used
9 for training and one for testing. This is repeated 10 times and each time a different
set is chosen for testing.
Figure 11: Accuracy of Models for Static, Dynamic and Combined Features for Ad-
ware vs Benign Classification
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Our experiments showed that using dynamic features alone for detecting adware
is not sufficient as the accuracy was only about 76% when experimented with com-
bined features the accuracy improved to 84%. Though the overall accuracy for binary
classification is higher for static features, about 85%, we still prefer using combined
features as we suspect the model overfits a little as the dataset is small. From Fig-
ure 11, we see that linear SVC is not ideal for this case and tree-based techniques
like adaboost or random forest works well. Adaboost results are slightly higher than
random forest or MLP irrespective of the feature set used. This shows that dynamic
features are not sufficient enough to detect adware and using tree-based ensemble
methods with combined features is more suitable for this task.
Plotting Area under ROC for the models with combined features shows that the
value is higher for random forest (0.9) than adaboost (0.83) though, the accuracy
for adaboost was slightly higher. Figure 12 shows the ROC curve for ten fold cross
validation for adaboost and randomforest when combined features were used for de-
tecting adware. The area under the curve for SVC in Appendix A shows that it did
no better than flipping a coin thus validating that accuracy alone is not enough to
evaluate a model.
Adaboost Random Forest
Figure 12: Area under ROC for Combined Features for Adware vs Benign
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4.3.2 Results for Scenario B
Once the results showed that combined featureset gave better results in detecting
adware, the next experiment was to identify the minimum number of features needed
for detection. We used Recursive Feature Elimination on the combined 37 feature set
which was trained on different models like random forest, adaboost and SVC without
cross-validation. The results as shown in the Figure 13 indicates that the accuracy
does not improve after 12 features when using adaboost, around 88%. SVC based
RFE does not suit for identifying the important features and with random forest, the
accuracy though is the highest at 87.4% for 17 features but it does not give consistent
results like adaboost. Also, the accuracy is high when trained with 12 features and
remains fairly stable with lower accuracy after that for adaboost.
Figure 13: RFE on Combined Features
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4.3.3 Results for Scenario C
In addition to a binary classification, we evaluated the performance of a two level
classifier with combined features where, the first model was trained to detect adware
as in Scenario A and the second classifier was trained to identify the family an app
belongs to. Multiclass classifiers like One vs Rest and One vs One were used where,
the former trains one classifier per class and the latter trains classifiers for each pair
of classes. The results in Figure 14 show that the family of an app can be detected
with an accuracy of 99% when one vs rest strategy is used for adaboost and random
forest.
Figure 14: Accuracy of identifying family of apps using combined features
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4.3.4 Results for Scenario D
This section describes the results obtained by training a model to detect each of
the adware families from benign apps with and without ads. Specifically, we discuss
the results from classifying each family with benign apps with ads as both kinds fetch
ads but one is benign and the other is adware. The graph in Figure 15 shows the
accuracy of classifying each family against the benign apps with ads. We can see
that MLP identifies each family with the highest accuracy, that is above 84% when
combined feature set is used. Next, tree-based ensemble techniques like random forest
and adaboost produce comparative results but more towards the lower side. On the
other hand, linear model like SVC did not perform well. Combined features accurately
classifies benign apps with ads from individual family while dynamic features can help
in detecting apps from judy, marswin, hamob and origin family. Detecting humming
bad with dynamic features alone is insufficient. Static features though gives good
results for all families we do not recommend it as the dataset used is small and thus
model might is doing better. A similar graph for detecting apps from a particular
family from benign apps is given in Appendix A.
4.4 Discussion
From the experiments, we infer that detecting adware can be tricky as several
benign apps also display ads using ad libraries. Our results show that it is better to use
combined features than using static or network-based dynamic features individually
to avoid bias. Adware can be identified with an accuracy of 84% using tree-based
ensemble techniques when using combined features and with an accuracy of 88%
when suing only 12 features instead of all 37 for adaboost. The important features
are shown in Table 4 for adaboost and in Table 5 for random forests. Ensemble
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based techniques when used as a second level classifier plays a vital role in identifying
the family label each app belongs to with higher accuracy than the linear models or
neural networks. MLP can effectively separate each adware family from apps with ads
with higher accuracy compared to other models, but when all the apps are combined
together it’s accuracy decreases. This may be due to the fact that the neural network
model does not have enough data to learn from.
Table 4: Important Features by Adaboost
Number Feature Name Importance
1 numberOfPermissions 0.238420
2 numberOfActivities 0.143715
3 httpCount 0.092341
4 numberOfContentProviders 0.074321
5 dnsMaxAnswerLength 0.073395
6 flowCount 0.061364
7 maxIdleTime 0.049825
8 ratioOfRBySPkts 0.039481
9 numberOfServices 0.037938
10 noOfPkts 0.035264
11 maxPayloadHttp 0.032320
12 ratioOfRBySIP 0.015808
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Table 5: Important Features by Random Forest
Number Feature Name Importance
1 numberOfPermissions 0.101284
2 numberOfActivities 0.088013
3 flowCount 0.076565
4 noOfPktsSent 0.064180
5 avgPayloadHttp 0.052946
6 numberOfContentProviders 0.050890
7 maxIdleTime 0.047395
8 avgIdleTime 0.044745
9 dnsAvgAnswerLength 0.042894
10 maxPayloadHttp 0.042866
11 httpCount 0.039604
12 dnsResCount 0.035854
13 noOfPkts 0.034824
14 numberOfBroadcastReceivers 0.034635
15 numberOfServices 0.027704
16 noOfPktsReceived 0.026180
17 dnsMaxAnswerLength 0.020036
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Copycat Ghostclicker
Hamob HummingBad
Judy Marswin
Origin
Figure 15: Accuracy of classifying each family vs benign apps with ad
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CHAPTER 5
Conclusion and Future Work
To keep up with the growth in the mobile and the advertising industry it is
important to prevent fraudulent attacks to ensure that the right content reaches the
user to gain a return on investment from the advertisements. In the mobile front
the first step is to detect adware from benign apps and once the malicious apps are
detected it is important to remove them from being available to the general public to
prevent billion-dollar losses. In this experiment, we analyzed the importance of static
and dynamic features for classifying the adware and static features turned out to
be the winner when used with ensemble models. Thus machine learning approaches
provide a good mechanism to detect and classify adware and it also fares well when
it encounters adware in real time.
From the experiments conducted, we conclude that dynamic features alone are
not sufficient to detect and classify adware, a combination of static and dynamic
features performs better. As the next step, we can evaluate the above experiments on
a larger dataset. Features related to system calls and UI components could also be
used for detection. Periodicity can also be considered to detect adware as some adware
frequently tries to connect to the C&C center for further processing. Another frontier
to test would be to determine the difficulty in segregating malware from adware.
One could extract information by running the apps on a real smartphone instead
of using an emulator as malware developers sometimes disable malicious routines on
emulators.
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APPENDIX
Results for Adware vs Benign Classification
Figure A.16: Area under ROC with combined features for SVC
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Figure A.17: RFE of Static Features
Figure A.18: RFE of Dynamic Features
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Figure A.19: Accuracy of Classifying each Family against Benign Apps without Ads
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